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THE MARCH OF WAR
WARFARE IX THE PHLLIPPIXES
(October 77, 1944, to }'ebruar!J 10, 1945)
H,
LEYTE
ON October Ii, 1944, US forces put intoLeytc Gulf; but bad weather preventedimmediate landing maneuvers. As the
storm abau,'(\, carrier· based air sq uadrons
of the invaders attacked the island, and on
October 19 the first disembarkation took place
at 9 a.m. at Cabalian. Thus the first US troop
contingents set foot again on the Philippines
almost two and a half years a.fter the ca.pitula.
tion of Corregidor. The Cabs-Han landing was
followed by another at Tacloban, only to be
repulsed despite a heavy artillery barrage from
US naval forces. The attempt was repeated
on the following day, and this time part of
the invaders managed t.o reach shore 8nd
establish a bridgehead, to which they added
another one at Dulag on October 21. Pouring
reinforcements into the beachheads of Tacloblln
and Dulag, the Americans pushed from here
northwestward>! toward Carigara Bay and due
west toward BUrllUcn and the airfields in the
vicinity of that place.
While ,Japanese ground forces battled against
the some three S divisions that had been
landed. ,Ja.pa,nc·se air formations attacked the
enemy transport fleet and the escorting war·
ships. The real counterblow wal! begun on
October 24, when tho ::lpecial at,tack corps of
the Japane"e air force went into action agaiJlst
three US ta.sk forces in waters
east of the Philippines. to be
joined on October 2:3 by Japa.ncse
na.val forces. In thill "Sea Battle
off the Philippines," which lasted
until October :W, and in repeated
engagements ill Le)"t.o Gulf (Octo-
ber 19 to 25), the Amcrican Navy
lost 8 aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers,
3 destroyers, \} transports, and
numerous lanning barges sunk;
500 planes destroyed; and 4
battleships, 9 airoraft carriel's, 2
cruisers, and 3 destroyers dam.
aged. The Japanese 10llSes
amounted to 1 battleship, I
aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, 2 de·
stroyer, and 126 planes, I ad·
ditional aircraft carrier being
da.maged. The greater part of the
American los. ('Ii WIIS accounted
for by Japanese naval forces which. after
penetra.ting into Leyte Gulf through Surigao
Strait, wrought havoc among the a'· f'mbll'd
enemy fleet.
The Japanese brought up troop reinforce-
ments .ia Ormoc, and on ~ovembcr S l:enerlll
Tomoyuki Yamashita was appointed Cornman·
del' in Chief, replacing General. 'higenori Kuroda.
The enemy divisions initially landed, belong.
ing to the 6th US Arm.)" lUlder Lieutenant
General Walter Krueger, had meanwhile been
strengthened, and another landing was effectC'd
early in No,-ember at Abuyoc. Having gain('(1
n. foothold in the eastern plain of the illiand-
which is separated from the western part b~'
mountains and jungles-the American com·
mand aimed at gaining access to the we tc'ru
coast by way of the corridor leading from
Carigara Bay to Ormoc, with un exc('Uent road
to count on. But the 24th US Divi.:sion, ad'·anc·
ing along the road from Carigara, met wit h
extremely fierce resistance and, moreo,-er. fOllnd
itself in a precarious position when Japllne::4c
formations succeeded b)" means of infiltration
tactics in cutting it off. Reinforcements, in·
eluding the 32nd US Di,·ision, were hastily
landed by way of Carigara.
The advance from Abuyoc across thE' island
to Baybay and thence northward was !IL.,o
checked; but here the US command could out·
Hank the defenders by landing operations fur-
ther north. Disem bnrkat iOll~
were carried out at Albuern and
further to the northwest enrh'
in December for the purpose r;r
capturing the Japanese supply
base of Ormoc anrl ~llilJilJl.(
access to the corridor leading t(,
Carigara Bay. After >IIrong ("e:;ist-
ance, Ormoc finnlh· ft'll 011
December 12. The bnWe now
went on further to the north lind
west where, during the sceolJd
half of December, the Ameri·
cans landed at PalolDpon undo
on January 1, just south of
Villaba.
1n the Burauen sector the de· -
fenders took the initiati,-e early
in December. In a series of
well co·oruinated ground anJ
air.ll'nc.ling operation:! they reo
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captured three airfields and lashed out in the
direct,ion of Dulag and against positions in
the Tolosa sector. Although General Mac·
Arthur claimed at the end of December
that the Leyte campaign was te'rminated, the
Burauen airfields were in Japanese hands on
.January 5. and at the time of writing fighting
is continuing on the island in spite of the
supply difficulties confronting the defenders.
SA~1AR A~D MINDORO
Around ~ovember,10 the Americans also
crdsSed the channel separating Tacloban from
Samar Island and advanced to Hinabangan,
ouly to be thrown back to Ca.lbiga.
Of greater tactical significance was the ap·
pearance of an American task force in Surigao
~tra.jt on December 13. It pushed on into the
'ulu Sea and began landing maneuvers on the
southern part of Mindoro Island at San Jose,
where the Americans managed to gain a foot-
hold and layout airfields in preparation for the
invasion of Luzon.
The American forces engaged in battle on
Leyte and Samar, aggregating some seven
livisions, suffered heavy casualties. Moreover,
the US Navy ustailled serious losses in war-
ships and t,rallsports in addition to those al·
ready mentioned. They were largely inflicted
by tbe "body crashing" tactic of the special
attack corps of the Arm~' and Navy-the famed
Kamikaze (KllVY) and Banda, .Fugaku, Yasu-
kllni, Hakko Ichiu, Gokoku, ekicho, Teshin,
and Kinno (Army) formations-the results /x>-
tween October 25 and December 22 totaling
11S units either sunk, damaged, 01' set ublaze.
These special att.nck corps oro composed of
airmen who, after intense physical a.nd spiritual
training, go Ollt on their mi ion of dt' troying
enemy target. from which there will be no
return, Cra!lhing into their objecti\'e, they can-
not fail to hit it; amI in t1lt'ir spirit of self-
sacri fice they demonst rate their nat,ion's Sll preme
will to win ill l.lpitt> of any materiul superiority
of t be enemy,
LUZO~
The ent,ire cO!ltl,r Leyte enterprise could only
hay a meaning for the Americans if it was
regarded a a first 'tep t.oward till' conquest of
Luzon, Lcytc itself being of littl \'aluc to the
American. as lon).( lUI it WIUI surrounded by
islandR oc upied by the Japanese.
Since December 3, Luwl.\ was exposed to
hea vy American bombing attacks Ilnd since
December 27 the Japa,nese pres continually
reported the' mO\'ements of large American
troop con \'(1."S. all of them ob,riously destined
for Luzon. Jt may be remembered that. before
the landing at Le):te, the American TllSk .Force
.is bad appearJd off Taiwan ill order to keep
the Japane . fleet away from til<' Philippines.
And when another ta..k force appeared again off
Taiwan on January 3, thi also indicated a new
big blow against the Philippines.
Which coastal area had been chosen by the
Americans for their landing /x>carne obvious on
January G when a large convoy including 70
to SO large landing vessels entered Lingayen
Gulf on the northwest coast of Luzon and
started an intensive naval and air bombardment
on the coast. Certain indications seem to
point toO the fact t.hat a landing {Tom the first
convoy had been planned for January . How-
ever, the stiJI Japanese resistance, and partic-
ularly their special attack corps, forced the
convoy to change its course on the morning of
8th toward the we.st and to wait for the arrival
of the second convoy, wbioh lOlly have originally
been intended a8 a second landing wave. Dis·
embarkations began on January 9 at 9.40 a.m.
If the American Commander in Chief General
MacArthur has delared in his communique
that the landing found the Japanese Wlpn~·
pared. this can, in \,;ew of the above facts, be
dismissed &8 nonsense.
Wlint were the reasons leading tho Amcricall:!
to the ohoice of Lingl\ycn GIlIf? The !lame
which caused tile Japa.nesc on December 22,
1941. to la nd the bulk of their troops for the
ellptllre of Luzon there too, The Gulf, which
i only 1 '0 kilometers from )1anila has (I) nil·
merOIl lIlall harbors; (2) u road system leading
towflrd MUllila; (3) the railway Dalllork~/
Tarlac,')'fanila; (4) fiat country favoring motor-
ized troops.
The landing took place in the innermost purt
of the Gulf between San l"uLian allu Linga.ven,
The Americans fir t o:;t.aLlished four bea~h.
heads which they then proceedro to conllect.
On II th another la.nding was made at Damort,j,.;
north of 'un Fabian. By the third day, some
100,000 Americans had di embarked Oil Luzoll,
All in aU, a,bout 800 Allied ships of all types.
including ten aircraft carrierll, participated
direct.ly or indirectly in the landing. Th('
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any length of time. A;o I\, result, the American
forces reached the olltl"kirt:s of ~1nllila three
and a half weeks after the first landing in
Lingayen Gulf. Here, howen'r, they {'Ilcoun·
tered stiff resistanc('.
Where are General Yamashita's divil:lion8~
Although they have not yet made un uppe&r'
ance, it seems that thf'y are oncc-ntrated ill
t he rectangular northern part of Luzon north
of the )jne which fUUS a pproximatcly frolll
Santo Tomas via DlllUortis antI Rosario south.
eastward to thc east co t of Luzoll. There
has been much guessing about the possible
reasons for General Yama&hita'~ flnrprising
strategy. Among the consideratiollll )jkely to
have contributed to his decision are the follow.
ing two.
(I) The .Japanese knew that vt'I'y htrgo
American forces were designatt."<1 for ihe at,tack
on Luzon (on ~'cbruary JO the .Japanesc spoke
of 20 America.n divisions already landed 011 the
island) and that they would be 'able to prevl'nt
neither their landing nor, ill view of tho 111I·
favorable open terrain around Manila. thl:' fall
of that city. Northern Lllzon. on the other
hand, with'it.s more than 30.04)0 !.lfllUlre kilo·
meters and mountain rangl:'s-t he two largest
of which, the Cordillera del Norte and the
Sierra Madre, rise to height>; of 2.:WO Ilnd 1,2MO
meters respectively-is well suited all a barp for
protracted fighting with the landed American
forces.
(2) Northern Luzon is drnined bv the
Cagayan R,iver, the biggt',..t in the ar hirelago.
abollt 3.30 kilometers long and suited for navi·
gation, while the port of Aparri at the mouth
of the river is closcst to Taiwan and .JI~pnll
and easier to keep open than )Ianilu 1.18 a port
of Sll pplie ,
At any rate, the Japa nese appear to II/H'e
settled down to a costly war of attrition for, II
1I0meone recently Pllt 'it: "The Anwricans are
after territory, and the Ja panCflt' aftcr .-\mcri·
cans...
For thc imminent batt los. both oppononts
posse. greltt ('xperi('nce, the Alllericalls in
landing, the Jnpanes(' in fighting IIgninlit landed
troops. :From Ouadllicanul to the Lingayen
Uulf, it is a 29·months' ami 5,;)OO-kilometer;;'
long bloody tra.il of grim battles bctwf'cn IlIlId·
i.ng forCC8 and defenders.
As for the attainment of their goal of cut·
ting off conne tiona betwecn Japan Ilnd the
.Japanese positions in i\lala.i llnd Hurmll by the
occupation of Luzon, the Americans have come
too late, as the Japanese, for{'Reeing the danger
threatening Luzon. have sccureu u\'crland
connections between .Japan and Indo·China
through their curnpaigns in (,hilla la::;t year.
di\'i"ions that were lAnded belong t·o the 6t,hn, Arm~' undcr Lif'utenant General Krueger,
the participating air forces were under t,he com·
mlUid of Gelltmtl J\cnny, while the 3rd and
ith l S tleet.s taking part. are commanded by
Arlmirals Halsey and Kinkaid.
.'\s Yf't there has been no large.scale Il\nd
hattlc. The .Japanese did not attempt to 1're-
\'ent the landing as such but concentrated their
effort inflt,ead on inllicting as hea\'y losses as
I'0;lsible in ships, ill<.>n, and material on the
('n<.>my. aimiug (' peciaUy at interfering with or
('utting off the supplies of tho landed troops
by inct>s&\.nt attacks upon the American trans·
port fleet. The weak spot of the Americans in
the PltjIjppines is the tremendous length of
their supply linea, ":,'en if part of thc supplies
I\rc coming from New Guinea l\nd Australia., the
majority of the war matl:'rial and the troops
must be transported from the U A, one third
(If the earth's circumferencc a.way. It ROOms
probable that the Philippine e~mpaign was
worked out in its details by t he Allies in the
ummer of BU-., whcn they believed the end
of tho European war to be imminent and the
cmployment of huge transport fleets in the
Pacific appeared feasible. The course taken by
t he winter battle on the Western Front has
proved t he fallacy of the Allied speculation.
The Allied tmnsport problem is the link joinillg
the Pacific and EuroJ.ICan wars.
Further American la.ndings occurred ncnr
:-lnnto Tomas (.January :!I); at Balinao and
Alaminos "horth- afterwards; in ubic Bay
(,Ianuary 30); at N~ ugbu, south of ManiJ'U
(.Jauuary 31)' and, by paratroops, somcwher<.>
('ast of Na,'mgbu (February 4). A glancc at.
the map is enough to >lhow that the aim of all
these landing. was Manila. Obviously t.he
Americans expect<.>d the Japanese to rf2'peat
)lacArthur's strategy of 19.Jt and concentrat.e
I heir forces in and around the capital. Allied
reports during the first few days after the
Lingayen lundillg expresscd the belief t.hat the
Pllcitic war'R biggest clash and the fir~t grcat
tank bo.ttll:' betwcen Jap/UlORe <llld American
forces would take place in the plains north
o( Manila, wherc tho Am ricanlJ expected to
t'ncollnter some ItlO,OOO o( Japan's best 801-
•lief!.!.
:\11 the great<'r was the . mericans' surprise
-in fact, one of their biggcst surprises in the
prCi!ent war-when they dl. cov('red that Gen·
ernl Yllma hita's main force was not stantling
between them and :\lanila. The Japanese
forces thE' Americans cn oWlterxl on their
IlIlU'ch to the Philippine capital though bravely
holding up their advance, obviolltlly did not
('xpt'ct. to I'l'6vent their entry into Manila (or
rJ{~fA)ard
Thc A'fluri<-oll Govcrnment hns di~lribl1tcJ so munv ",iJir.ar\· m",I"J.,; snu
t1..o:orul ions \e\'en to dogsl thot thc~' have loeCOlllO an obJc<'l of ritliculo 1I11l0Dli(
the ArnericIIII soIJion;. A st.Blluing wi~ecrn..k: .. He gOI I ""t filed.. I fur pre'venl.
in;; I'''P('; h dlnngetl his mill"."
